In this paper, we aim to empirically examine the value of website usage and sellers' listing behavior in the two leading Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions. The descriptive data analysis of the seller's equilibrium listing behavior indicates that a seller's higher expected auction revenue from eBay is correlated with a lager number of potential bidders measured by website usage per listing. Our estimation results, based on the logarithm specifications of sellers' expected auction revenues and potential bidders' website usage, show that in a median case, (i) 1 percent increase of the unique visitors (page views) per listed item induces 0.022 (0.007) percent increase of a seller's expected auction revenue; and (ii) 1 percent increase of sellers' listings induces 1.99 (4.74) percent increase of the unique visitors (page views). Since increased expected auction revenues will induce more listings, we can infer positive feedback effects between the number of listings and website usage. Consequently, Yahoo!Auctions, which has substantially less listings, has greater incentives to increase listings via these feedback effects which are reflected in its fee schedules.
I. Introduction
For the last two and a half years, the fluctuation of the market value of an e-commerce firm has been huge. First, the potential growth of e-commerce has hit the stock market: due to the Internet related stocks, the Nasdaq composite index went up more than 70 percent in 1999. Then, the enthusiasm of the Wall Street was struck by disappointing profits and worries about slowing economy. Between December of 1999 and August of 2001, the stock price of eBay peaked at $127.50, plunged to $26.75, and then bounced back to the range of $50 to $70. During the same time period, the stock prices of Yahoo! and Amazon.com continuously plunged from the level of $250 to the level of $10 and from the level of $110 to the level of $8, respectively. The valuation of Internet stocks is particularly difficult mainly because e-commerce is still only in the beginning stage and its potential outreach is believed to be huge.
1 Hence, it is speculated that accounting information such as bottom-line net income is usually of limited use in the valuation of Internet stocks. Instead, website usage measured by 'unique visitors' or 'page views' 2 is often considered as a good proxy for the potential growth and profitability of an e-commerce firm in the future. For example, Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000) found that Internet usage provides considerable explanatory power for the prices of some Internet stocks (before the plunge in 2000). The recent plunge of e-commerce firms' stock prices, however, may cast doubts on this argument.
In this paper, we aim to empirically examine the value of website usage in a particular ecommerce called Internet auctions. We are specifically interested in: (i) how website usage affects a seller's expected auction revenue; and (ii) whether there exist positive feedback effects between the number of listings and website usage. We begin by raising a question why website 1 Although the potential outreach of e-commerce is believed to be huge, online sales still remain a small portion of total retail sales. In 1998, electronic retailing sales accounted for 0.5 percent of all sales, and in 1999, they are projected to account for 1.2 percent (see "Survey Show Online Sales up 300%," The New York Times, December 29, 1999) . 2 'Unique visitors' is the estimated number of different individuals who visit a firm's website, and 'page views' is the number of unique visitors multiplied by the average unique pages viewed per visitor.
usage is a valuable (or relevant) information in Internet auctions. As indicated in the literature of auction theory (see Levin and Smith (1994) ; Bulow and Klemperer (1996) ), the seller's expected auction revenue depends on the number of the potential bidders. Hence, when a seller decides which Internet auctions site he/she will list his/her item on, he/she may refer to website usage (as well as number of other listings) for the number of potential bidders in an Internet auctions site.
In the paper, therefore, we will understand the value of website usage as a relevant information on the size of potential bidders. Specifically, we will assume that a seller's expectation for the number of potential bidders in an Internet auction site is proportional to the website usage per listed item on the site. We will also consider that website usage may be not exogenously determined but influenced by the number of listings. A potential bidder may prefer to log on to an
Internet auctions site with a larger number of listings because the probability that he/she may find an item to bid for will be greater. On the other hand, in the case of the common value auctions, the bidder's expected profits may fall with additional bidders due to the effects of the winner's curse. 3 Hence, it will be an empirical question whether increased listings will induce more or less usage in Internet auctions. It is also noteworthy that Amazon.com has charged $0.10 insertion fee and final value fees at the rates of eBay since it entered. Consequently, Amazon.com has had less than a quarter of the listings on Yahoo!Auctions.
III. The Model
A seller will decide which Internet auctions site he/she will list his/her item on. The seller's expected revenue from listing the item on Internet auctions site j depends on the expected revenue from auctioning the item and the fees charged by site j. There are two types of fees to sellers: insertion fees, say F j , and final value fees, say α j . Let R j denote the seller's expected auction revenue from site j. Then the seller's expected revenue from listing his/her item on
Internet auctions site j is:
(1)
In equilibrium, the seller's expected revenues from listing the item on any auction website must be the same. Then for any two auctions sites, say e and y, we have in equilibrium: table 1 ). Yahoo!Auctions does not charge final value fees, but at eBay, the final value fees are 5 percent of the sale price up to 9 If the secret reserve price is not met by the close of the auction, the item will not be sold. In practice, a seller sets a low opening value with a high secret reserve price to attract bidders who may drive up the $24.99, 2.5 percent from $25.00 up to $1000.00, and 1.25 percent over $1000.00. A seller's choice of an opening value (and thus an insertion fee) may depend on the number of potential bidders. As documented in Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) , opening value is believed to be the most important determinant of entry of bidders in Internet auctions. In practice, sellers usually set a low opening value to attract more bidders in Internet auctions. 10 The survey of Lucking-Reiley (2000) indicates that as of fall 1998, most of collectibles traded on
Internet auctions are relatively inexpensive with median prices well below $100. In the U.S.
mint/proof coin sets auctions on eBay, as reported in Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) , the average opening value was $16.28 while the average value of the traded coins is $47. Hence, in the paper,
we will consider as a median case a seller listing an expected auction value of $50 on eBay with an opening value between $0.10 and $24.99. Hence, the equilibrium condition in (2) indicates that a median seller will expect about 4 percent less revenues from auctioning the same item on Yahoo!Auctions than on eBay.
11
As pointed out in the literature of auction theory, a seller's expected revenue auctioning on site j depends on several factors such as the number of potential bidders, say N j , and available auction mechanisms, say m j , such as available auction formats and a set of parameters which the seller can choose in each auction. That is, R j = R(N j , m j ), where R is a real function. Since both eBay and Yahoo!Auctions offer almost the same choices of auction formats and auction parameters, we can infer that a seller's different expected auction revenues from eBay and Yahoo!Auctions mainly result from the different numbers of potential bidders. As discussed in section I, we assume that a seller's expectation for the number of potential bidders is proportional to the website usage per listed item. In fact, eBay has substantially larger website usage per listed price. 10 As indicated in Lucking-Reiley (2000), the conventional wisdom seems to be that $0 opening value plus a $50 secret reserve price would be more profitable to the seller than a $50 opening value with no secret reserve price. Therefore, the equilibrium condition of the listing behavior in (2), combined with our empirical observations on listing fees, available auction mechanisms, and sizes of potential bidders, implies that a seller expects a higher auction revenue on eBay than on Yahoo!Auctions and this higher expected auction revenue is positively correlated with a lager number of potential bidders. Note that our descriptive analysis does not assume any specific auction mechanism nor private-value or common-value settings.
12 Equation (2) describes equilibrium listings for given website usage. Website usage, however, may be not exogenously determined but influenced by the number of listings. A potential bidder may prefer to log on to an Internet auctions site with a larger number of listings because the probability that he/she may find an item to bid for will be greater. On the other hand, in the case of the common value auctions, the bidder's expected profit may fall with additional bidders due to the effects of the winner's curse. Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) argued that their empirical findings of eBay auctions were more consistent with common-value auctions than private-value auctions. Hence, it will be an empirical question whether increased listings will induce more or less usage in Internet auctions. The comparison between eBay and Yahoo!Auctions as shown in figures 1 -3, however, indicates that larger usage is strongly correlated with more listings in Internet auctions.
insertion fee of $0.35 on Yahoo!Auctions. Hence the seller will pay $2.075 more fees on eBay, which is approximately 4 percent of the final value. 12 Amazon.com, the third largest Internet auctions site, is not included in our analysis for several reasons. First, we do not have an access to website usage data of auctions on Amazon.com. We were told that Nielsen//NetRatings did not collect usage data of auctions separately from the usage data of Amazon.com as a whole because website usage of auctions on Amazon.com is not substantially large. Second, although Amazon.com is the third largest Internet auctions site, it is considerably smaller than Yahoo!Auctions, the second largest. Lastly, Amazon.com offers various different auction formats and cannot be directly compared with the two leading sites without positing specific auction mechanisms.
In general, we can describe website usage of site j, say U j , as a function of its own listings, say L j , the others' listings, say L -j , and the other factors, say O j , such as the influence of the other auctions sites and potential bidders' unobservable preferences of site j.
where U is a real function.
IV. Quantitative Analyses
In this section, we will specify a seller's expected auction revenue function, R(N j , m j ), Based on the seller's expected auction revenue function in (4), we will use the equilibrium condition of listing behavior in (2) to estimate b, the elasticity of the seller's expected revenue with respect to the expected number of potential bidders. The estimation based directly on the equilibrium condition of (2), however, causes several difficulties. First of all, the equilibrium condition in (2) leads to a complicated nonlinear estimating equation. With 15-week aggregate listings and usage data, we may not expect to obtain any significant estimates from this complicated nonlinear estimating equation. Moreover, even with disaggregate (a huge amount of)
seller-level data, the parameter a then must be indexed by each item listed by sellers. In order to avoid too many different parameters (different a's indexed by item), we may have to posit a certain structural model of the auction mechanism. Hence, to keep our analysis simple and robust to specific auction mechanisms, we will simplify the equilibrium condition of (2), calculating an auction premium of eBay equivalent to the difference in insertion and final value fees (between eBay and Yahoo!Auctions) in the median case. As discussed in section II, in the median case, the seller's expected revenue from auctioning his/her item on eBay is about $50 with an opening value between $10.00 and $25.00. Then in this median case, the seller will expect approximately 4 percent less auction revenue on Yahoo!Auctions, 13 and hence, the equilibrium condition in (2) can be rewritten as follows:
where α = 0.04. Note that if the seller's expected revenue from auctioning his/her item on eBay is about $100 with an opening value between $10.00 and $25.00, then α = 0.033. 14 Then from (4) and (5), we can obtain the following estimating equation: 13 Refer to footnote 11. 14 If the final value on eBay auctions is $100 with an insertion fee of $0.55, then the seller will pay the total fee equal to $3.675 (= $25(0.05) + $75(0.025) + $0.55) on eBay auctions, while the seller will pay only an (6)
where ε =ξ e − ξ y . Since ξ j is not correlated with the numbers of potential bidders, we can apply an OLS estimation procedure for (6). Table 2 In Internet auctions, website usage may be influenced by the number of listings. As discussed in section III, larger usage is strongly correlated with more listings in Internet auctions.
To quantify the effects of listings on website usage, our quest here is for a simple specification of the usage equation in (3) without specifying the probability that a seller find an item to bid for nor the auction mechanism. We will use a logarithm specification as follows: Taking logarithm on both sides of (7), we can obtain the following estimating equation:
Since η j is not correlated with L j and L -j , we will apply an OLS estimation procedure. Table 3 reports the estimation results of the estimating equation (8 Consequently, Yahoo!Auctions, which has substantially less listings, has greater incentives to increase listings via these feedback effects which are reflected in its fee schedules.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we empirically examine the value of website usage and the relationship between usage and listings in the two leading Internet auctions sites, eBay and Yahoo!Auctions.
Our quantitative analyses show that 1 percent increase of unique visitors (page views) per listed item induces 0.022 (0.007) percent increase of a seller's expected auction revenue. Furthermore, we can infer positive feedback effects between the number of listings and website usage, which are similar to the indirect network effects documented in the market for Yellow Pages as in Rysman (2000) and in the VCR cases as in Park (2001) . The existence of these positive feedback effects may provide explanations for why eBay, the start-up company in Internet auctions, has been able to maintain its dominant position and why Yahoo!Auctions, a later entrant, set lower insertion fees and no final value fees.
In Internet auctions, a seller can not restrict the number of potential bidders of a certain site but can choose an auction site based on the sizes of potential bidders. Our empirical finding invites more theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between the number of potential bidders and a seller's expected auction revenue. The theoretical predictions on this relationship depend on whether potential bidders' entry to an auction is endogenous or not. Levin and Smith (1994) , based on the equilibrium analyses of auctions with endogenous entry, concluded that the expected revenue of any seller who uses her optimal mechanism decreases with the number of potential bidders in a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium. 15 Hence, if the number of potential bidders is too high, the seller can be better off ex ante by restricting the number of potential bidders. On the other hand, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showed that very generally in a privatevalue auction and also in a wide class of common-value auctions, a simple ascending auction with no reserve price and N+1 symmetric bidders is more profitable to the seller than any realistic auction with N of these bidders. At a first glance, our empirical finding that a seller's expected auction revenue increases with the number of potential bidders in Internet auctions seems to be more consistent with the presumption in Bulow and Klemperer (1996) . However, the experimental evidence of eBay auctions in Lucking-Reiley (1999) was supportive of stochastic endogenous entry in Internet auctions.
Our intuition for this discrepancy between the theoretical prediction and our empirical finding in Internet auctions is that any Internet auctions site may not have reached the sufficient number of potential bidders (or n* in Levin and Smith (1994) ). As reported in Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) , the average number of bidders for U.S. mint/proof coin sets was only 3 on eBay auctions. The stochastic entry reported in Lucking-Reiley (1999) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) may be generated not by mixed strategies but by other things happening in bidders' lives as discussed in Lucking-Reiley (1999) . In reality, sellers pay more fees for featured auctions and set low opening values (usually with higher secret reserve prices) to attract more bidders in Internet 
